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In Defense of Disparate Impact:  
Urban Redevelopment and the Supreme 




Twice in the past three years, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari 
in Fair Housing cases, and, each time, under pressure from civil rights lead-
ers who feared that the Supreme Court might narrow current Fair Housing 
Act jurisprudence, the cases settled just weeks before oral argument.  Settle-
ments after the Supreme Court grants certiorari are extremely rare, and, in 
these cases, the settlements reflect a substantial fear among civil rights advo-
cates that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in cases such as Shelby 
County v. Holder and Fisher v. University of Texas are working to dismantle 
many of the protections of the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s.  The sole 
issue in both of the recently settled Fair Housing Act cases was whether dis-
parate impact analysis – a type of analysis that some on the Supreme Court 
may view as requiring racial preferences – is valid under the Fair Housing 
Act. 
This Article argues that in order to have a chance at achieving the goal 
of its sponsors – “to replace the ghettos [with] truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns,” – the Fair Housing Act cannot just take aim at the aberrant 
individual who intentionally denies a person housing because of his or her 
race.  Instead, the Fair Housing Act must recognize claims based on dispar-
ate impact analysis alone.  This Article posits that disparate impact analysis 
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is particularly critical in the context of urban redevelopment decisions be-
cause such decisions are often made through a multi-party protracted pro-
cess, in which a discriminatory intent may be impossible to discern or entire-
ly absent.  It is the outcome of large-scale urban redevelopment projects, not 
individual decisions to rent or sell, that will truly shape racial housing pat-
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and 
unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a 
willful scheme.”1 
In the past few Supreme Court terms, the Supreme Court has seemed in-
clined to tighten its grip on anything it deems a “racial preference.”2  In the 
2012-2013 term alone, the Supreme Court stripped the Voting Rights Act of 
its main enforcement mechanism and narrowed its acceptance of affirmative 
action programs.3  It appears that the Supreme Court is now hoping to limit 
the existing interpretation of another pillar of the Civil Rights era – the Fair 
Housing Act. 
Twice in the past three years, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari 
in Fair Housing cases, and, each time, under pressure from civil rights leaders 
who feared that the Supreme Court might narrow current Fair Housing Act 
jurisprudence, the cases settled weeks before oral argument.4  The sole issue 
in both of these cases was whether disparate impact analysis – a type of anal-
 
 1. United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 
1974) (citing Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967)). 
 2. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 
(2009). 
 3. Shelby Cnty., Ala., 133 S. Ct. at 2631; Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421-22. 
 4. See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, N.J., 
658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013) and cert. denied, 
134 S.Ct. 636 (2013); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. grant-
ed, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  See Joan Biskupic, Analysis: Rights Groups Try to Avoid 
U.S. High Court Setback, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/2012/03/02/us-usa-court-civil-rights-idUSTRE82117X20120302, for in-
formation related to the concern among civil rights leaders that the Supreme Court is 
intent on limiting disparate impact analysis.  “Civil rights advocates took extraordi-
nary steps over the last three months to persuade the city of St. Paul, Minn., to with-
draw a fair-housing case the U.S. Supreme Court had already agreed to hear, reflect-
ing their expressed fears about the court under Chief Justice John Roberts.”  Id.; See 
also Emily Gurnon, St. Paul Withdraws U.S. Supreme Court Petition in Housing 
Discrimination Case, TWINCITIES.COM (Feb. 10, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.twincit-
ies.com/ci_19938569; Adam Liptak, Housing Case Is Settled Before It Goes to Su-
preme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-before-it-reaches-supreme-court.html
?_r=0; David O’Reilly, Mount Holly Gardens Discrimination Dispute Settled, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-11-15/news/44078231_1_
township-residents-olga-pomar-south-jersey-legal-services; Valerie Schneider, Set-
tlement in Fair Housing Case – A Sigh of Relief, ACSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2013), http://
www.acslaw.org/acsblog/settlement-in-fair-housing-case-a-sigh-of-relief. 
4
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ysis that some on the Court may view as requiring racial preferences – is val-
id under the Fair Housing Act.5 
This Article argues that preserving disparate impact analysis is critical 
to ensuring that the Fair Housing Act has a chance to fulfill its missions of 
decreasing housing segregation, increasing housing opportunities for minori-
ties, and combatting housing discrimination.  Furthermore, this Article argues 
that the facts of many modern housing discrimination cases, particularly in 
the urban redevelopment context, are particularly appropriate for disparate 
impact analysis.  In urban redevelopment cases, racially disparate and segre-
gation-increasing impacts often flow not from a single decision-maker moti-
vated by racial bias (such cases could be addressed by disparate treatment 
analysis).  Instead, redevelopment decisions, such as where to build afforda-
ble housing and how neighborhoods might be redeveloped, involve a long 
term, multilayered and diffuse process in which intent is often not relevant to 
an inquiry into whether the principles of the Fair Housing Act have been up-
held. 
The Supreme Court’s apparent interest in limiting the use of disparate 
impact analysis in Fair Housing cases is a recent phenomenon.6  Since the 
enactment of the Fair Housing Act forty-five years ago, Fair Housing juris-
prudence, which is modeled in large part on employment discrimination ju-
risprudence, has treated disparate impact analysis as a given – the eleven cir-
cuits that have confronted the issue have all assumed or decided that suits 
based on harms that have a disparate impact on members of a protected class 
are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, regardless of whether those perpe-
trating the harms had a discriminatory intent.7 
 
 5. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at 382; Gallagher, 619 
F.3d at 829. 
 6. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An 
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 359-60 (2013). 
 7. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 
1250-51 (10th Cir. 1995); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 
F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, Ohio 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.20 (11th Cir. 1984); 
Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton, N.C., 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. 
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Arlington 
Heights II]; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977); Unit-
ed States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974); see also 
2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n. v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (“[E]very one of the eleven circuits to have considered the issue has held 
that the [FHA] . . . prohibits not only intentional housing discrimination, but also 
housing actions having a disparate impact.”).  While it is true that the eleven circuits 
that have confronted a disparate impact challenge have decided or assumed that dis-
parate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, I note that in Arling-
5
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This Article seeks to understand the Supreme Court’s apparent interest 
in limiting the use of disparate impact analysis in Fair Housing cases,8 and it 
argues that, without disparate impact analysis, there is little hope that the Fair 
Housing Act will be able to nudge our society in the direction of less segre-
gated living patterns and more housing opportunities for minorities. 
Part I of this Article describes the story behind the most recent disparate 
impact case that made its way to the Supreme Court and was settled just 
weeks before argument: Township of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citi-
zens In Action, Inc.  Additionally, Part I provides historical context regarding 
passage of the Fair Housing Act and the progression of Fair Housing juris-
prudence. 
In Part II, this Article confronts textualists who insist that, because the 
Fair Housing Act does not contain the magic word “affect,” it is unconcerned 
with acts that disproportionately burden members of protected classes.9  In 
this part, I dissect the text of the Fair Housing Act to demonstrate that its 
language supports disparate impact analysis like its cousins, Title VII of the 
 
ton Heights II, the Seventh Circuit suggested that some finding of intent might be 
required. 558 F.2d at 1290, 1292.  That said, as explained in Part V of this Article, the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) recently promulgated 
a regulation formalizing the burden-shifting approach.  Under the rule, the approach is 
as follows: 
(1) The charging party, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, 
or the plaintiff, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614, 
has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will 
cause a discriminatory effect.  (2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies 
the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent 
or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is neces-
sary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests 
of the respondent or defendant.  (3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the 
burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party 
or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, non-
discriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by 
another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. 
24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). 
 8. As noted elsewhere in this Article, the current Supreme Court has not yet had 
an opportunity to issue a decision related to disparate impact in the context of a Fair 
Housing Act case.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  In light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent race-related decisions in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013), and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), and 
in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on such cases twice 
in the past three terms despite the absence of a circuit split, many advocates and 
scholars predict that the Supreme Court is likely to limit disparate impact analysis if 
given the opportunity.  At the time of this writing, a petition for certiorari has been 
granted by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing and Community Af-
fairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., which raises the issues of whether dis-
parate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, and, if so, what 
standards of proof should apply.  No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2014 WL 2815683, at *2 
(N.D. Tex. June 23, 2014). 
 9. See infra Table 1. 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (“ADEA”) (both of which have been held to support disparate 
impact claims by the Supreme Court and the first of which was amended to 
explicitly include such claims). 
Part III of this Article turns to scholarship that suggests that the dispar-
ate impact theory is simply a way to show intentional discrimination through 
circumstantial or indirect evidence10 – e.g. if you cannot prove discriminatory 
intent by showing that a housing provider made racist comments, maybe dis-
criminatory intent can be inferred by looking at evidence that a policy has a 
disproportionate impact on minorities.11  Here I argue that, while evidence of 
disparate impact can certainly strengthen an intentional discrimination claim, 
a claim based on unintentional discrimination also can stand on its own under 
the Fair Housing Act. 
Part IV contains the meat of this Article.  It examines the manner in 
which municipalities actually make housing-related redevelopment decisions.  
I posit that, because of the diffuse and non-linear manner in which housing-
related decisions are made, particularly in the context of so-called “urban 
redevelopment” projects, intent to discriminate may never be found (and, 
indeed, may not exist), even where there is a clear discriminatory impact that 
undermines the purpose of the Fair Housing Act.  For the Fair Housing Act to 
have a legitimate role in nudging our society closer to equality in housing 
opportunities across racial lines, redevelopment decisions must be subject to 
disparate impact analysis. 
In the final part of this Article, I examine common concerns about dis-
parate impact jurisprudence and propose some methods for addressing such 
concerns. 
 
 10. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 701, 706 (2006) (arguing that the development of disparate impact 
theory in the employment discrimination context had the perverse effect of truncating 
the development of intentional discrimination jurisprudence). 
 11. See Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289-90 (holding that under some cir-
cumstances a violation of the FHA can be established by showing discriminatory 
effect without showing enough discriminatory intent as required in Equal Protection 
jurisprudence after Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); see generally Selmi, 
supra note 10, at 702-03, 707.  According to Arlington Heights II, four factors should 
be considered when there is not a strong showing of discriminatory intent: (1) the 
strength in plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of discriminatory 
intent, “though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. 
Davis”; (3) the defendant’s interest in taking the action that produced the discrimina-
tory impact; (4) whether the plaintiff seeks “to compel the defendant . . . from inter-
fering with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.”  558 F.2d 
at 1290. 
7
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I.  THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY 
A.  Mount Holly, New Jersey 
The human story behind the most recent disparate impact case that set-
tled shortly before the Supreme Court was to hear oral arguments12 –
Township of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens In Action, Inc.13 – 
highlights the ways in which, in the urban redevelopment context, intent to 
discriminate may be irrelevant to an inquiry into whether the principles of the 
Fair Housing Act have been upheld. 
The plaintiffs in Mt. Holly were former and current residents of Mount 
Holly Gardens (the “Gardens”), a subdivision in Mount Holly Township, 
New Jersey (the “Township”), who sued the Township in an effort to block 
redevelopment plans.14  Those redevelopment plans called for the complete 
demolition of all existing homes in the Gardens community in order to make 
 
 12. The Mt. Holly case is the second of two disparate impact cases for which the 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the past two years.  The first of the two cases 
– Gallagher v. Magner – was particularly troubling to proponents of disparate impact 
claims because it was brought by an unusual and unsympathetic set of plaintiffs in the 
Fair Housing context: landlords who owned dilapidated housing.  619 F.3d 823, 830 
(8th Cir. 2010).  In Gallagher, sixteen landlords sued the City of St. Paul, claiming 
that the City’s aggressive enforcement of the housing code disproportionately impact-
ed their low-income tenants, most of whom were African American.  Id. at 831.  Per 
the landlords, the City’s enforcement of the housing code would force the landlords to 
either spend money fixing properties (a cost which would be passed to the mostly 
minority tenants) or to take properties off the market (making rental housing less 
available to minority tenants).  See Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief with Addendum at 21-
22, 29-30, Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1209).  Though 
the landlords asserted that aggressive enforcement of the housing code would harm 
their minority tenants, no tenants joined the suit.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found 
that the landlords had presented a prima facie case of disparate impact.  Gallagher, 
619 F.3d at 837.  Fair Housing groups vigorously opposed the petition for certiorari 
via amicus briefs.  See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Hous. Advocates, Inc. & 
Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. in Support of Respondents, Gallagher v. Magner, 619 
F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1209).  Even Walter Mondale, the Fair Housing 
Act’s principal sponsor, weighed in, worried that a conservative and business-friendly 
Supreme Court might find that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the 
Fair Housing Act, which would, according to Mondale, “de-fang the Fair Housing 
Act.”  See Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing Fight from High Court, STAR 
TRIBUNE (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/139138084
.html.  Even St. Paul’s Mayor, Chris Coleman, who had originally pressed the case, 
feared that under the facts of Gallagher, the Supreme Court might grant a pyrrhic 
victory for the City that would ultimately weaken the Fair Housing Act.  See Gurnon, 
supra note 4.  Bowing to pressure, the City requested dismissal of its petition in Feb-
ruary of 2012.  Id. 
 13. 133 S. Ct. 569 (2012). 
 14. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 
375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011). 
8
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way for a new residential development, the prices of which would be out of 
reach for almost all of the Gardens current and former residents – essentially, 
the planned development would have wiped the one predominantly minority 
community in the Township off the map, scattering its minority residents to 
even more segregated communities.15 
The Gardens was originally constructed in the 1950s to house military 
families, and it consisted of approximately 325 two-story brick row houses.16  
By the 1970s, the neighborhood suffered from many of the problems associ-
ated with underserved and poor communities – population growth stressed 
the infrastructure of the neighborhood and crime rates rose steadily.17  In re-
sponse to these circumstances, some members of the neighborhood came 
together to address the challenges.  In the 1970s, for example, residents 
formed a nonprofit called “Mt. Holly Citizens in Action” (the named plaintiff 
in the Mt. Holly case), which worked with residents and Township officials to 
help address problems in the community.18  Additionally, in the 1990s, com-
munity activists worked to revitalize the Gardens by rehabilitating properties 
and advocating for increased social services.19  These efforts resulted in the 
renovation of ten homes and the establishment of a community-policing cen-
ter.20 
Despite the improvements, the infrastructure in the community contin-
ued to fail while the crime rate ticked upwards.  The Township commissioned 
a study in 2002 to determine whether the Gardens should be designated as a 
blighted area “in need of redevelopment” pursuant to New Jersey’s redevel-
opment laws.21  Over the strong opposition of many Gardens residents, “the 
study concluded that the entire Gardens neighborhood was blighted.”22 
 
 15. Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 8, Twp. of Mount 
Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 569 (2012) (No. 11-
1507) (“The court below observed that the Township was purchasing Gardens homes 
for $32,000 to $49,000 and that ‘[t]he estimated cost of a new home in the develop-
ment was between $200,000 and $275,000, well outside the range of affordability for 
a significant portion of the African-American and Hispanic residents of the Town-
ship.’”).  The relocation-assistance plan was woefully inadequate and had the effect of 
displacing Gardens residents from the neighborhood.  Id.  Brief for Mt. Holly Gardens 
Respondents at 10, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 569 (2012) (No. 11-1507) (“Given the ‘severe shortage of affordable 
housing’ in Burlington County, many Gardens renters reported being unable to find 
affordable housing elsewhere in the Township . . . [a]nd more than two-thirds of 
renters who accepted Township assistance were relocated out of the Township.”). 
 16. Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents, supra note 15, at 3. 
 17. Id. at 3-5 (noting the fact that the community suffered from severe drainage 
problems due to residents paving backyards as parking in the area became more 
scarce). 
 18. Id. at 4. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Id. at 5. 
9
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The Township adopted a redevelopment plan in 2003, which was 
amended in 2005 and 2008.23  The 2008 plan called for the construction of up 
to 520 townhomes and apartments, of which only fifty-six would be designat-
ed as “affordable housing,” and of those fifty-six, only eleven would be of-
fered to existing Gardens residents on a priority basis.24  Unfortunately, for 
almost all of the residents of the Gardens, even the most “affordable” homes 
in the new development would be out of reach – few, if any, members of the 
existing community would be able to stay in their homes and benefit from the 
revitalization of the neighborhood.25 
With a redevelopment plan in place, the Township began to dismantle 
the Gardens community.  Starting in 2002, the Township started to purchase 
homes in the Gardens at prices ranging from $32,000 to $49,000 – a price 
that would do little to allow residents to relocate within Mount Holly or any 
non-segregated nearby areas.26  Despite this, sensing that the Township might 
exercise eminent domain rights if they did not acquiesce, many residents and 
landlords took the deals offered to them and fled.27  Unable to afford homes 
nearby with the money offered by the Township, most former residents 
moved from the relatively diverse Township to much more segregated com-
munities.28  As a result, the Township became increasingly white, making 
already segregated communities even more segregated.29 
Within a few years, more than 200 homes were purchased by the Town-
ship and destroyed.30  Many of the homes that were demolished were attached 
to ones where residents remained, leaving broken bricks, gaps, and leakage 
and drainage problems for the residents who wished to stay in their homes.31  
As of June, 2011, of the 325 original brick row houses, only seventy homes 
remained under private ownership.32 
Explaining why she did not wish to leave the Gardens neighborhood, 
one of the few remaining residents said, “When I bought the house, I thought 
I’d be here for the rest of my days.”33  Another resident remarked, “My chil-
dren are here.  My roots are here.  My grandkids live around the neighbor-
hood.  I don’t want to go nowhere.  I want to stay in Mount Holly.”34  The 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 6. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 8. 
 27. Id. at 7. 
 28. See id. at 3. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. at 9. 
 31. Id. at 6-7. 
 32. Id. at 8. 
 33. Inst. for Justice, Scorched Earth: Eminent Domain Abuse in the Gardens of 
Mount Holly, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMDnC
cSUfao. 
 34. Id. 
10
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few remaining residents live among empty lots, destroyed homes, and dam-
aged infrastructure. 
As noted above, the Gardens was the only neighborhood in the Town-
ship with predominantly African American and Hispanic residents.35  Among 
the 1,301 residents of the Gardens, “46.1% were African-American, 28.8% 
were Hispanic, and 19.7% were non-Hispanic whites.”36  The Township’s 
plan to destroy the Gardens and replace it with housing that was out of reach 
to its current residents meant that almost all of the Township’s minority resi-
dents would have to move to other municipalities.37  If the redevelopment 
plan were enacted, the Township would likely become significantly more 
white, and the individuals who once lived in the relatively integrated Town-
ship (when looking at it as a whole) would likely be forced into more segre-
gated areas.38  This is exactly the problem that the sponsors of the Fair Hous-
ing Act sought to remedy – of course, the sponsors of the act were concerned 
with acts of intentional discrimination, but, as then Senator Walter Mondale 
explained, the thrust of the Fair Housing Act was also aimed at replacing the 
ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”39 
B.  History of Residential Segregation 
In order to understand why disparate impact analysis is needed to com-
bat racial segregation, it is important to understand the forces that lead to the 
types of racial segregation that are now pervasive in American cities and 
towns. 
When standing at a subway stop at rush hour in many American cities, it 
is often easy to determine the destination of the train by the race of those who 
board or disembark.  If one sees a white crowd boarding a redline train in 
Boston, Massachusetts, for example, one can guess that the train is heading 
north to Cambridge, a neighboring city that is majority white.40  If the crowd 
consists mostly of African Americans and other minorities, one may guess 
that the train is heading south towards Dorchester, a predominantly minority 
section of Boston.41  Similarly, if one boards a yellow line train in Washing-
ton, D.C., one might be able to guess from the racial mix of the occupants 
whether the train is heading towards Prince Georges County (a predominately 
 
 35. See Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents, supra note 15, 
at 3; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 36. Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents, supra note 15, at 3. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
 40. See Demographics and Statistics FAQ, CITY OF CAMBRIDGE CMTY. DEV. 
DEP’T, http://www.cambridgema.gov/cdd/factsandmaps/demographicfaq.aspx (last 
visited June 23, 2014). 
 41. See Dorchester Census Breakdown, BOSTON.COM, http://www.boston.com/
yourtown/boston/dorchester/news/census_2010/ (last visited June 23, 2013). 
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African American county in Maryland) or towards Arlington (a predominant-
ly white county in Virginia).42 
The segregation pervasive in modern American cities is not just the re-
sult of economic disparities between races (as some assume); segregation also 
stems from systematic public and private efforts to isolate racial minorities.43  
Though many urban neighborhoods were relatively racially integrated in the 
early part of the twentieth century, by the end of the 1920s whites began to 
utilize a variety of legal tools to exclude African Americans from white 
neighborhoods.44  Restrictive covenants in deeds prohibited whites from sell-
ing their homes to African Americans.45  Discriminatory zoning practices 
locked African Americans out of particular neighborhoods.46  Discrimination 
in sales, rental, and financing practices was widespread, and there were few 
legal tools for challenging such practices.47 
In the 1930s, these tools of segregation, which had been practiced most-
ly on a local or individual level, began to be more strongly reinforced by fed-
eral policies that embraced racial discrimination in federally assisted hous-
ing.48  The housing policies of the New Deal “brought the full force of the 
federal government to the aid of institutionalized racial segregation.”49  The 
Federal Housing Administration, with its new program of guaranteed mort-
gages, adopted policies that promoted, and indeed called for, racial discrimi-
nation.50  For example, the Federal Housing Administration’s guidelines for 
mortgage appraisals called for protection of neighborhoods from the “infiltra-
tion of inharmonious racial groups.”51  Additionally, an agency manual ex-
plained that neighborhood stability was an important factor to consider in 
underwriting policies, indicating that “[a] change in social or racial occupan-
 
 42. See Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year “First Step”: The Fair 
Housing Act As an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1617, 1617-18 (2007) (“A typical commuter will always know which train will be 
next to arrive on [the Metro] platform by the clear racial makeup of those who are 
waiting – black professionals will be the overwhelming majority if the Green Line is 
about to arrive, and white professionals will dominate the platform if the Yellow Line 
is next.”). 
 43. See id. at 1620 n.12, 1631. 
 44. Id. at 1620 n.12. 
 45. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 
2:2 (2012); cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1948) (holding that racially 
restrictive covenants are unconstitutional). 
 46. SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at § 2:2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Karl Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 341 (1988). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (quoting U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITERS MANUAL 935 (1938)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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cy generally contributes to instability and a decline in values.”52  As home-
ownership became the principal way for Americans to build wealth, the Fed-
eral Housing Administration systematically worked to deny this opportunity 
to African Americans, resulting in a lasting wealth gap between African 
Americans and whites, which persists today.53 
It was not just the federal government that systematically worked to in-
crease segregation in urban environments; the real estate industry whole-
heartedly endorsed the federal government’s views on racial segregation.  
Until 1950, for example, the Code of Ethics of the National Association of 
Real Estate Boards specifically enjoined its members from introducing 
“members of any race or nationality” into a neighborhood if such persons 
“will clearly be detrimental to property values.”54  Even when edited in re-
sponse to pressure from civil rights leaders, the language was changed to 
thinly veil the clearly discriminatory intent – the post-1950 provision read, “a 
Realtor should not be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a char-
acter or use which will clearly be detrimental to property values in that 
neighborhood.”55  The words “race” and “nationality” were replaced with 
“character” and “use,” but the purpose of the provision was clear. 
During the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, the reach of public and private seg-
regationist policies became even broader.  Federally subsidized highway con-
struction and urban renewal programs often reduced the supply of low-cost 
housing, fragmented neighborhoods, and reinforced the segregated housing 
patterns.56  “Blockbusting” – a practice by which real estate agents facilitated 
white flight from neighborhoods by creating a scare that African Americans 
were moving into the neighborhood – became widespread.57  Banks increased 
the pace of racial isolation by “redlining” African American neighborhoods, 
refusing to lend (or offering much higher interest rates) in African American 
 
 52. John O. Calmor, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A 
Back-to-The-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1511 (1993) (quoting CITIZENS’ 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A DECENT HOME: A REPORT ON THE CONTINUING 
FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY 
81-82 (1983)) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53. Brian Gilmore, Home Is Where the Hatred Is: A Proposal for a Federal 
Housing Administration Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 249, 252-53 (2011). 
 54. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE BDS, Part III, art. 34 
(1924); Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 
808, 810 n.14 (1976). 
 55. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE BDS., Part III, art. 34 
(1950).  In 1950, the former Part II, Article 34 became Part I, Article 5 of the Code of 
Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards. 
 56. Taeuber, supra note 49, at 342. 
 57. SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at § 2:2 (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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communities.58  In fact, from 1960 to 1970, “every geographic region in 
America experienced an increase in residential segregation by race.”59 
To understand why disparate impact analysis is needed in the urban re-
development context, it is necessary to understand that the current conditions 
in most urban areas are not the result of natural migrations of communities or 
individual choice; the conditions are a direct result of widespread private and 
public policies with the explicit intent to segregate communities by race.  As 
explained in greater detail below, the harms created by such longstanding 
intentional segregation cannot be undone without now taking into account the 
potential racial implications of redevelopment decisions. 
1.  Enactment of the Fair Housing Act 
In order to understand why disparate impact analysis is in line with the 
purposes of the Fair Housing Act, it is important to examine the context into 
which the Fair Housing Act was born. 
The Fair Housing Act came late in the story of housing segregation – af-
ter the core civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965, after the start of the urban un-
rest of the mid 1960s, and after a National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders warned that the nation was becoming two societies, separate and 
unequal.60 
From the early 1960s, organizations such as the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) and the National Commit-
tee Against Discrimination initiated efforts to push a housing-related civil 
rights bill through Congress with no success.61  As African American soldiers 
returned from Vietnam and were forced into segregated veterans’ homes or 
were unable to find housing due to discrimination, the media – including tra-
ditionally white media outlets – began to focus on unrest related to housing.62  
At the same time, provoked by profound discrimination, isolation, and frus-
tration, protests and violence broke out in African American urban areas 
throughout the country, most notably starting with the Watts Riots in 1965, 
the Division Street Riots in 1966, and the Newark Riots in 1967.63 
 
 58. Taeuber, supra note 49, at 341-42. 
 59. SCHWEMM, supra note 45 (citing SCOTT MCKINNEY & ANN B. SCHNARE, 
URBAN INSTITUTE PROJECT REPORT NO. 3727: TRENDS IN RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 
BY RACE: 1960-1980, at 13 (1986)). 
 60. Taeuber, supra note 49, at 342 (citing NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N OF CIVIL 
DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 
(1968)). 
 61. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Ismail Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair Hous-
ing and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L.J. 841, 850 n.46 (2005). 
 62. See, e.g., Pentagon Seeks to End Off-Post Housing Bias, KENTUCKY NEW 
ERA, Aug. 18, 1967, at 1, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=266
&dat=19670809&id=O-orAAAAIBAJ&sjid=YWcFAAAAIBAJ&pg=4805,3540598. 
 63. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N OF CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1, 25 (1968) [hereinafter CIVIL 
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As riots and protests intensified in the late 1960s, President Lyndon 
Johnson appointed Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, Jr. to head a commission 
charged with developing a report on civil unrest in urban areas.64  The com-
mission’s report, dubbed the “Kerner Report,” concluded that urban civil 
unrest in African American communities was caused in large part by white 
racism – not a surprising conclusion in hindsight, but at the time the report’s 
conclusions were revolutionary.65  The Kerner Report indicated that America 
was “moving towards two societies, one black and one white – separate and 
unequal.”66  The report recommended, among other things, the elimination of 
barriers to choice in housing and the passage of a national and enforceable 
“open housing law.”67 
The Kerner Report was released on March 1, 1968, as the Senate was in 
the midst of a filibuster blocking Fair Housing legislation cosponsored by 
Senators Walter Mondale and Edward Brooke III (who was, at the time, the 
only African American member of the Senate).68  With the release of the 
Kerner Report, and with the help of Republican Everett Dirksen, Mondale 
and Brooke were able to attain a two-thirds Senate vote for cloture of debate.  
The legislation was subsequently passed by the Senate on March 11, 1968.69 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination on April 4, 1968, served as a 
catalyst for the bill’s quick passage through the House with its essential pro-
visions intact.70  On April 10, 1968, the House voted 250-172 to accept the 
Senate’s version, and the next day, April 11, 1968, President Johnson signed 
the bill into law.71 
The Fair Housing Act made it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent . . .  or to 
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or 
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex . . . or 
national origin.”72  It also made it illegal to “discriminate against any person 
in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental” because of that per-
 
DISORDERS REPORT], available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.
pdf. 
 64. See generally id. 
 65. See id. at 25. 
 66. Id. at 1; see also SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at § 5:2 n.12 (citations omitted). 
 67. CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT, supra note 63, at 24. 
 68. Larkin, supra note 42, at 1623. 
 69. SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at § 5:2 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. 
Feb. 20, 1968)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is commonly referred to, and 
will be referred to herein, as the “Fair Housing Act.” 
 72. Pub L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 
(2012)).  Amendments in 1988 added familial status and handicap status as protected 
classes.  See Scott N. Gilbert, You Can Move in but You Can’t Stay: To Protect Occu-
pancy Rights After Halprin, the Fair Housing Act Needs To Be Amended To Prohibit 
Post-Acquisition Discrimination, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 762-63 (2009). 
15
Schneider: In Defense of Disparate Impact
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
554 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
son’s membership in one of the aforementioned protected classes.73  Addi-
tionally, the Fair Housing Act included provisions related to blockbusting, 
discriminatory advertising, discriminatory lending and other prohibited acts.74 
2.  Housing Segregation Now 
Despite the Fair Housing Act’s broad prohibition against discrimination 
in housing, forty-five years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act housing 
patterns in the United States continue to be characterized by high levels of 
segregation.  Demographic trends in the 1970s seemed to suggest that in-
creased racial integration might be on the horizon – African American in-
come levels were rising, the rate of poverty in African American communities 
was declining, and African Americans “had begun to join the exodus of fami-
lies from central cities to suburbs.”75  With these trends in mind, and armed 
with the newly-enacted Fair Housing Act that prohibited discrimination, civil 
rights leaders were optimistic about increasing residential racial integration.76 
Despite the fact that the nation seemed poised to enter a more integrated 
period in the early 1970s, census data shows that from 1970 to 2010 “the 
overall level of residential segregation between African Americans and 
whites declined only modestly.”77  By 1980, over one third of African Ameri-
cans lived in “hyper-segregated” communities, in which they were so isolated 
that they rarely encountered non-African Americans in any context (i.e. in 
stores, workplaces, etc.) in their neighborhoods.78  Housing segregation no 
longer limited just who people saw in their neighborhoods; it also created an 
environment in which many African Americans and whites never came into 
contact in employment, commerce, schools, or many other facets of daily 
life.79  This type of hyper-segregation has continued into the twenty-first cen-
tury, with the 2010 census showing “only modest reductions in residential 
segregation.”80 
While there may have been hope when the Fair Housing Act was passed 
that lawsuits addressing individual acts of intentional discrimination would 
lead to increased integration or housing opportunities for African Americans, 
the persistent levels of segregation indicate that combatting isolated instances 
 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). 
 74. Id. 
 75. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 60-61 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1993). 
 76. Id. 
 77. SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at § 2:2. 
 78. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 75, at 77 (discussing how no other group in 
the contemporary United States comes close to this level of isolation).  Although 
Hispanics are considered poor and disadvantaged compared to whites, they do not 
suffer nearly as much as African Americans from residential isolation.  Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at § 2:1. 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss3/2
2014] IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 555 
of intentional discrimination alone will not lead to a reduction in segregation.  
As discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this Article, more weapons 
are needed in the fight to increase housing opportunities for minorities, and 
among these weapons is the disparate impact theory. 
C.  The Development of Fair Housing Act Jurisprudence 
In order to understand why the Fair Housing Act supports disparate im-
pact claims, as argued in depth in the remaining portions of this Article, it is 
first important to understand more about the development of case law under 
the Fair Housing Act, particularly as it relates to disparate impact claims. 
The Supreme Court first addressed a disparate impact claim in the civil 
rights litigation context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., an employment dis-
crimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.81   
Title VII, passed four years prior to the Fair Housing Act, served as a model 
for the Fair Housing legislation and is structurally and linguistically similar in 
many respects.82 
The Griggs case was brought by African American employees, claiming 
that Duke Power’s Dan River plant in Draper, North Carolina utilized em-
ployment practices that had a disproportionately negative impact on African 
Americans and therefore violated Title VII.83  In the 1950s, Duke Power‘s 
Dan River plant had a policy that African Americans were limited to work in 
its “Labor Department,” which constituted the lowest-paying positions in the 
company.84  In fact, the highest paid African American employee made less 
than the lowest paid white employee.85  In 1955, the company added the re-
quirement of a high school diploma for its higher paying jobs.86 
After the passage of Title VII in 1964, the company no longer officially 
restricted African Americans to the Labor Department, but it retained the high 
school diploma requirement and added the requirement of an IQ test for non-
Labor Department jobs.87  African American applicants were less likely to 
hold a high school diploma and averaged lower scores on the IQ tests than 
their white counterparts; thus, they were selected at a much lower rate for 
these positions compared to white candidates.88 
The plaintiffs in Griggs used statistical evidence to show that the IQ test 
and high school diploma requirements had a disparate impact on African 
 
 81. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  In her article A Social Movement History of Title VII 
Disparate Impact Analysis, Susan D. Carle notes that the concept of disparate impact 
analysis predates Griggs.  63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 294 (2011). 
 82. See infra Part II. 
 83. 401 U.S. at 425-26. 
 84. Id. at 426-27. 
 85. Id. at 427. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 427-28. 
 88. See id. at 430 n.6. 
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Americans.89  In North Carolina in 1960, thirty-four percent of white males 
completed high school, while only twelve percent of African American males 
did so.90  Further, fifty-eight percent of whites passed Duke’s standardized IQ 
tests while only six percent of African Americans did so.91  The plaintiffs also 
showed that whites who had been promoted prior to the enactment of the 
requirements and who had neither passed the IQ test nor obtained a high 
school diploma performed their jobs as well as those who did meet the re-
quirements, meaning that the requirements were a poor measure of job per-
formance.92 
In its defense, Duke Power argued that its policies were race-neutral and 
that it lacked any intent to discriminate against African Americans.93  Indeed, 
the company argued that its lack of discriminatory intent was evidenced by its 
offer to fund high school training for non-high school graduates regardless of 
race.94  Noting that Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of” race, the 
company argued that racial discrimination requires an intent to treat members 
of a minority group differently.95  Without a finding of a racially discrimina-
tory intent, the company asserted, no violation of Title VII could be found.96 
The Supreme Court held that Duke Power’s intent or motivation for im-
plementing the IQ test and diploma requirements was not the only relevant 
issue; instead, the Court indicated that “Congress directed the thrust of [Title 
VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion.”97  According to Justice Burger’s majority opinion, practices and poli-
cies that are “neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot 
be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices.”98 
The Griggs Court did not hold that employers are without defenses 
when an employment policy is shown to have a disparate impact on a protect-
ed class.99  Instead, after the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of dispar-
ate impact, Griggs and its progeny indicate that the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to show that it had a nondiscriminatory business justification for its 
policy or decision.100  For example, in Griggs, the employer may have avoid-
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 431-32. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 432. 
 95. Id. at 433. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 432. 
 98. Id. at 430. 
 99. Id. at 432. 
 100. Id.  Theoretically, defendants could also simply rebut plaintiffs’ prima facie 
case without also asserting a business justification defense – i.e. defendants could 
argue that the plaintiff is not part of a protected class or that the evidence plaintiff 
presented does not show a disparate impact.  See, e.g., Steward v. Gwaltney of Smith-
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ed liability if it had shown that the IQ test and diploma requirements were 
appropriate predictors of job performance.101  Once the employer puts forth a 
business justification for its practice, the plaintiff has the final burden to show 
that said justification is unreasonable or is simply a pretext for discrimina-
tion.102 
Just one year after the Griggs decision, the Supreme Court issued its 
first decision under the Fair Housing Act in an intentional discrimination 
case, not a disparate impact case.  That case, Trafficante v. Metro Life,103 is 
important to discussions of disparate impact analysis for two main reasons.  
First, in holding that white tenants in an apartment complex who lost the so-
cial benefits of living in an integrated community had standing to sue under 
the Fair Housing Act, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Fair Housing 
Act is concerned not just with individual acts of discrimination, but also with 
 
field, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 1118, 1126 (E.D. Va.) (rejecting plaintiff’s vague assertions 
that employer did not promote minorities), aff’d per curiam, 103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 
1996).  In practice, defendants rarely rely on rebutting the prima facie case, and in-
stead, they almost always offer a nondiscriminatory business justification.  Accord-
ingly, the court’s task in Title VII litigation is usually determining whether the busi-
ness justification is convincing or whether it is simply a pretext for discrimination.  
See, e.g., Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Area Technical Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 434 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (explaining that plaintiff did not present evidence to demonstrate that de-
fendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring is pretext); United 
States v. City of N. Y., 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the New 
York City Fire Department’s use of written examinations to select candidates for 
admission to the New York City Fire Academy had little relationship to the job of a 
firefighter); NAACP, Newark Branch v. Town of Harrison, N.J., 749 F. Supp. 1327, 
1341-42 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that the residency requirements do not serve “in a 
significant way” the Town’s legitimate goals to ensure that employees establish loyal-
ty, have knowledge of the community, and can be “readily recalled” in emergency 
situations), aff’d sub nom. Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Harrison, 940 
F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 101. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. 
 102. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (explaining 
that if the respondent successfully carried his burden to establish a prima facie case 
and petitioner successfully rebutted the case, respondent must be afforded the oppor-
tunity to show that petitioner’s reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or was 
discriminatory in its application on retrial); see also United States v. Brennan, 650 
F.3d 65, 90 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that a plaintiff can prove that an employer’s assert-
ed justification is pretext for discrimination by showing that there is a reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternative to the employment practice, which the defendant failed 
to utilize). 
 103. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).  In this case, petitioners alleged respondents, owners of 
a rental property, discriminated against nonwhites on the basis of race in numerous 
ways, including “making it known to [nonwhite applicants] that they would not be 
welcome at [the rental community], manipulating the waiting list for apartments, 
delaying action on [nonwhite applicants’] applications, [and] using discriminatory 
acceptance standards.”  Id. at 207-08. 
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the values of integration.104  Second, the Supreme Court noted that the Fair 
Housing Act’s language is “broad and inclusive”105 and should be given 
“generous construction,”106 two phrases that are important in understanding 
why every circuit that has faced disparate impact claims has held that such 
claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.107 
Three years after the Griggs decision, the Eighth Circuit was the first to 
hear a disparate impact case under the Fair Housing Act – United States v. 
City of Black Jack.108  In City of Black Jack, a municipal zoning ordinance 
that prohibited construction of any new multifamily dwellings was challenged 
on the grounds that it would have a disparate impact on minorities, in viola-
tion of the Fair Housing Act.109  At the time, Black Jack, Missouri’s demo-
graphic makeup was almost completely white, with an African American 
population between one and two percent.110  The city of St. Louis, which 
abutted the city of Black Jack, was approximately forty percent African 
American.111  The plaintiffs argued that Black Jack’s ordinance prohibiting 
multifamily housing, while neutral on its face, would serve to preclude Afri-
can Americans, many of whom were seeking to escape overcrowded condi-
tions in St. Louis by moving into Black Jack.112 
 
 104. See id. at 212 (“We can give vitality to [§] 810(a) only by a generous con-
struction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured 
by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of 
the statute.”). 
 105. Id. at 209. 
 106. Id. at 212. 
 107. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (ex-
plaining that its analysis was “mindful of the Act’s stated policy” and “precedent 
recognizing the FHA’s ‘broad and inclusive’ compass, and therefore according a 
‘generous construction’ to the Act’s complaint-filing provision” (quoting Trafficante, 
409 U.S. at 209, 212)); Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro 
Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding persuasive that 
the broad and remedial purpose of Title VII is parallel with Title VIII as articulated 
by Griggs and Trafficante); see also Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he FHA must be given a ‘generous construction’ to carry out a 
‘policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.’” (quoting Trafficante, 
409 U.S. at 211-12)); Matarese v. Archstone Pentagon City, 795 F. Supp. 2d 402, 430 
(E.D. Va. 2011) (“The FHA is ‘broad and inclusive in protecting against conduct 
which interferes with fair housing rights and is subject to generous construction.’” 
(quoting People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 731 (E.D. Va. 
1992))), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub. nom. Matarese v. Archstone Cmtys., 
LLC, 468 F. App’x 283 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 108. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 109. Id. at 1181. 
 110. Id. at 1183; see also Eric W.M. Bain, Note, Another Missed Opportunity to 
Fix Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1434, 1444 
(2012). 
 111. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d at 1183. 
 112. See id. at 1186. 
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While the facts of the case seemed to support an inference of intentional 
discrimination,113 the Eighth Circuit relied on Equal Protection principles and 
disparate impact-oriented analogies to Griggs to hold that the zoning ordi-
nance in question resulted in an impermissible disparate impact on African 
Americans.114  The court held that the ordinance in question would “contrib-
ute to the perpetuation of segregation in a community which was [ninety-
nine] percent white,” and therefore that it served to “den[y] persons housing 
on the basis of race, in violation of 3604(a).”115 
In 1977, two years after the City of Jack Black decision, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled on a similar exclusionary zoning case in Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights.116  In that case, a housing 
developer sought rezoning of a fifteen-acre parcel of land in the Village of 
Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago, in order to construct a multi-family 
development.117  The development was to contain approximately 290 units, 
ninety of which would be designated for families with low or moderate in-
comes.  Construction of the development would have required the Village of 
Arlington Heights to change the parcel from a single-family zoning designa-
tion to a multi-family zoning designation.118  The Village of Arlington 
Heights denied the request, and the developer and other plaintiffs brought a 
suit alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and of the Fair Housing Act.119 
The trial court in Arlington Heights held that the municipality was not 
motivated by racial animus when it denied the rezoning, but rather by a desire 
to protect property values.120  Therefore, the trial court reasoned, there was no 
violation of any anti-discrimination law.121 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the lower court’s search into 
Arlington Height’s motivation was not the proper inquiry; instead, it assessed 
the disparate impact on minorities in light of “its historical context and ulti-
mate effect.”122  Per the 1970 census, the Village of Arlington Heights’ popu-
 
 113. See generally id. at 1182-83 (explaining that the city ordinance prohibited 
construction of any new multi-family dwellings and “made present ones nonconform-
ing uses” when the City of Black Jack was “virtually all white”). 
 114. See id. at 1184-85, 1188. 
 115. Id. at 1186, 1188. 
 116. 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974) [hereinafter Arlington Heights I], rev’d, 
517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 117. Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 254. 
 118. Id.; see also David L. Callies & Clifford L. Weaver, The Arlington Heights 
Case: The Exclusion of Exclusionary Zoning Challenges, 2 REAL EST. ISSUES, no. 1, 
1977, at 22. 
 119. Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 254. 
 120. 373 F. Supp. at 211. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Arlington Heights I, 517 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting Kennedy 
Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, N.Y., 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970)), 
rev’d, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
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lation was 64,000, only twenty-seven of whom were African American.123  
The Seventh Circuit found that the Village of Arlington Heights had not 
made “even a small contribution toward eliminating the pervasive problem of 
segregated housing,” and it therefore held that the Village of Arlington 
Heights’ rejection of the rezoning request had “racially discriminatory ef-
fects” and could be upheld “only if it were shown that a compelling public 
interest necessitated the decision.”124  Looking only to Fourteenth Amend-
ment reasoning, the court held that the desire to protect property values was 
not a “compelling public interest” and therefore refusal to rezone violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.125 
The Supreme Court did not agree with the Seventh Circuit’s Fourteenth 
Amendment reasoning.126  Relying primarily on its decision in Washington v. 
Davis,127 decided after the Seventh Circuit ruling but before Supreme Court 
oral arguments in Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court indicated that gov-
ernmental action would not be held unconstitutional solely because it resulted 
in a racially disproportionate impact.128  “Proof of racially discriminatory 
intent,” the Court held, “is required to show a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.”129  Because the Seventh Circuit had only considered the consti-
tutional question and not the Fair Housing question, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether the disparate 
impact caused by the Village’s denial of the rezoning request violated the 
Fair Housing Act.130 
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs, upon remand, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a finding of intent is not a prerequisite to a finding 
of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.131  In short, the Seventh Circuit 
ruled, in what has become known as “Arlington II,” that “at least under some 
circumstances a violation of [the Fair Housing Act] can be established by a 
showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory in-
tent.”132  The Seventh Circuit developed a four-prong balancing test for de-
termining whether a disparate impact claim should be cognizable under the 
Fair Housing Act, which has been used in three other circuits.133 
 
 123. Callies & Weaver, supra note 118, at 23. 
 124. Arlington Heights I, 517 F.2d at 415. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 270-71. 
 127. Id. at 265-66 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
 128. Id. at 266. 
 129. Id. at 265. 
 130. Id. at 271. 
 131. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971)). 
 132. Id. at 1290. 
 133. Id.  The Seventh Circuit determined that there were four “critical factors” in 
determining what circumstances produce a discriminatory impact.  Id.  First, the 
strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect.  Id.  Second, whether there 
is “some evidence of discriminatory intent,” even if “not enough to satisfy the consti-
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In the years following the City of Black Jack and Arlington Heights de-
cisions, nine more circuits confronted disparate impact cases under the Fair 
Housing Act, and each found disparate impact claims to be cognizable.134  
The circuits developed methods for evaluating disparate impact claims that 
varied slightly from each other in language and structure, but not in focus 
(with the exception, perhaps, of the Arlington II “four factor test,” which may 
be interpreted to require some showing of intentionality).135 
Despite over forty years of jurisprudence recognizing the disparate im-
pact theory under the Fair Housing Act, opponents of such recognition have 
contended, intermittently, that the Fair Housing Act does not support such 
claims or that such claims require actors to engage in a type of race-conscious 
thinking that violates the equal protection principles of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.136  The call for the end of disparate impact analysis under the 
Fair Housing Act became more pronounced during the debates about the 
1988 amendments to the Act. During the debates, Congress failed to either 
expressly ratify disparate impact analysis by including it in the amendments 
 
tutional standard of Washington v. Davis.”  Id.  Third, what the defendant’s interest is 
in taking the action which prompted the suit.  Id.  Fourth, whether the plaintiff seeks 
to “compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority 
groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property 
owners who wish to provide such housing.”  Id. 
 134. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 6, at 364-74; see also cases cited supra note 7. 
 135. Three slightly different tests have emerged.  First, a “‘balance-of the factors 
test’ is used in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits,” and was originally 
proposed in Arlington Heights II.  Bain, supra note 110, at 1446 n.83.  It asks courts 
to weigh the strength of plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; evidence of dis-
criminatory intent; defendant’s interest in taking action complained of; and, whether 
plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for protected 
class or to restrain defendant from interfering with individual property owners who 
wish to provide housing.  Id.  Second, a “‘burden-shifting analysis’ is used in the 
Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits.”  Id. at 1446 n.84.  It starts with the plaintiff making 
a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that (i) he or she is a member of a 
protected class and (ii) that the policy, action or decision in question has a significant 
disparate impact on members of that protected class.  See United States v. City of 
Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974).  The burden then shifts to the 
defendant to demonstrate that the action in question has a manifest relationship to a 
non-discriminatory objective and that the policy or decision is necessary to the 
achievement of this objective (this is similar to the “business necessity” language in 
Title VII jurisprudence).  Bain, supra note 110, at 1446 n.84.  Even if a defendant is 
able to meet its justification burden, the plaintiff may still prevail if he or she shows 
that a viable alternative means is available to achieve the policy objective without a 
discriminatory effect.  Id.  And finally, a “‘hybrid test’ is used in the First and Second 
Circuits.”  Id. at 1446 n.85.  It combines the two approaches described above.  See id.; 
see also Ann B. Lever & Todd Espinosa, A Tale of Two Fair Housing Disparate-
Impact Cases, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 257, 258 (2006). 
 136. Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 
2179 (2013). 
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or to expressly disavow it.137  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
disparate impact cases in the 2011-2012 term, and then again in the 2013-
2014 term, the conversation about disparate impact theory under the Fair 
Housing Act in academic and advocacy circles evolved from a simmer to a 
boil. 
II.  DISPARATE IMPACT – STARTING WITH THE TEXT OF THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT 
With two disparate impact cases in front of the Supreme Court in three 
years, there has been renewed attention directed at the disparate impact theo-
ry, especially in the context of challenges to urban renewal plans that have a 
disparate impact on minorities.  Some advocates have argued that, unlike 
Title VII and the ADEA, the text of the Fair Housing Act does not support 
disparate impact claims.138 
To make this case, opponents of disparate impact analysis point to the 
fact that, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, the Fair Housing Act does not con-
tain the word “affect.”139  From this, such advocates infer Congress meant for 
 
 137. Anti-disparate impact advocates point out that Congress had the opportunity 
to specifically embrace disparate impact analysis as part of the 1988 amendments and 
chose not to do so; proponents of disparate impact, of course, make the opposite 
claim, arguing that, at the time the 1988 amendments were being discussed, Congress 
was aware that all nine Courts of Appeals that had addressed the issue at that time had 
found that disparate impact claims were cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.  See 
ROBERT G. SCWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, DISPARATE 
IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 3-7 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE%20IMPACT%20
ANALYSIS%20FINAL.pdf.  Accordingly, per this argument, Congressional silence 
regarding disparate impact constituted a tacit approval of the status quo.  Id. at 4.  The 
Supreme Court, for its part, seems reluctant to infer anything from Congressional 
silence.  Id. at 12; see, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106 (2007) 
(“Ordinarily, we resist reading congressional intent into congressional inaction.”); cf. 
Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2009) (refusing to apply 
Title VII’s mixed motive burden-shifting framework to the ADEA because when 
Congress considered the two statutes simultaneously in 1991, it amended Title VII to 
include a mixed motive framework while it did not include such a provision in its 
amendments to the ADEA.).  Gross, however, applied to statutes being amended 
simultaneously.  557 U.S. at 174-75.  In the case of the Fair Housing Act, Congress 
simply neglected to amend it at the time it amended Title VII.  See also SCHWEMM & 
PRATT, supra, at 3-4, 9-13. 
 138. See Kirk D. Jensen & Jeffrey P. Naimon, The Fair Housing Act, Disparate 
Impact Claims, and Magner v. Gallagher: An Opportunity to Return to the Primacy 
of the Statutory Text, 129 BANKING L.J. 99, 102-09 (2012); see Petitioners’ Opening 
Brief at 17-26, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 569 (2013) (No. 11–1507); see also Brief for the Petitioners at 20-29, 
Magner v. Gallagher, 133 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-1032). 
 139. See Jenson & Naimon, supra note 138, at 108. 
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Title VII and the ADEA, but not the Fair Housing Act, to govern actions that 
have discriminatory effects.140 
Linguistically and structurally, however, the Fair Housing Act mirrors 
Title VII and the ADEA in many critical ways.  A portion of each act follows, 




 140. See id. at 111-12. 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 142. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
TITLE VII 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer – 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.141 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
It shall be unlawful for an employer – 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s age;142 
FAIR HOUSING ACT 
[I]t shall be unlawful – 
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to 
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make una-
vailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of ser-
vices or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, familial status, or national origin.143 
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Advocates who argue that the disparate impact standard should apply to 
Title VII and the ADEA claims but not to Fair Housing claims point energeti-
cally to the fact that Title VII and the ADEA both contain the word “affect,” 
as shown in bold above (and, indeed, via amendment, Title VII explicitly 
deals with disparate impact cases).144  These advocates have myopically fo-
cused on the absence of the single word “affect” in the Fair Housing Act 
without noting the similar or identical language in the key substantive lan-
guage in each act.145 
Each act contains language that focuses on the motivations of the actor.  
Title VII and the ADEA make it illegal to “fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual” based on his or her membership in a protected class.146  
Similarly, the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent” 
based on membership in a protected class.147  This language in all three acts 
focuses on the motivations of the actor.148  The question posed by this lan-
guage is: was the actor’s decision animated by the applicant’s race, sex, age, 
national origin, etc.? 
In contrast, each act also contains language that focuses on the impacts 
of potentially neutral decisions on protected classes, as opposed to an actor’s 
motivations.  In the cases of Title VII and the ADEA, this language appears 
in subparagraph (2) of the section excerpted above, and it indicates that it is 
illegal to take actions that would “deprive or tend to deprive” an individual of 
employment opportunities or “otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee” because of membership in a protected class.149  Similarly, in sub-
paragraph (1) of the language excerpted above, the Fair Housing Act makes it 
illegal to “otherwise make unavailable or deny” a dwelling because of mem-
bership in a protected class.150  Both of these clauses focus not on the motiva-
tions of an actor, but instead on the potential discriminatory impacts of such 
actor’s actions.  While the “affects” language in Title VII and the ADEA may 
be more explicit than the “otherwise make unavailable or deny” language in 
the Fair Housing Act,  the “otherwise make unavailable or deny” language, at 
the very least, can be logically construed to support the notion that the Fair 
Housing Act is concerned with claims where the effect of the actions, as op-
posed to the intent of the actor, is central. 
Advocates who argue that, without the “adversely affects” language, 
disparate impact claims simply cannot be cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act fail to note that the inclusion of the “adversely affects” phrase simply 
would not make sense in the housing context – e.g. the language of the Fair 
 
 144. See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 138, at 102-09. 
 145. See id. 
 146. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012). 
 147. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
 148. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text. 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). 
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Housing Act would have been strange indeed if Congress had made it illegal 
to “adversely affect” an individual’s “status” as a potential homeowner or 
renter.151  Instead, it is the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition against actions that 
would “otherwise make unavailable or deny” housing opportunities that gives 
a textual basis for disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act.152  
Actions that have a disparate impact on minorities often “make unavailable or 
deny” housing opportunities because of race, and such actions are prohibited 
by the language of the Act.153 
If you think that this debate about the linguistic similarities and differ-
ences seems strained, I would have to agree.154  My argument here is that 
reading disparate impact analysis into Title VII and the ADEA simply be-
cause those statutes contain the word “affect” while the Fair Housing Act 
omits that word in favor of more descriptive language (i.e. using the “other-
wise make unavailable or deny” language) is the most strained reading possi-
ble of the acts.  Indeed, no court has held that disparate impact claims must be 
based on the “adversely affect” phrase alone. 
As a final note about the text, I turn to the provision that animated many 
decisions in early disparate impact cases under the Fair Housing Act: the 
statement of purpose contained at the beginning of the Act.  The statement of 
purpose reads as follows: “It is the policy of the United States to provide, 
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United 
States.”155  Given the remedial purposes of the Fair Housing Act, courts have 
uniformly held that it is to be “given broad and liberal construction.”156 
III.   DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY IS NOT ONLY ANOTHER WAY TO 
SHOW INTENT; IT IS A SEPARATE COGNIZABLE THEORY 
A.  Disparate Impact Evidence Used to Prove Intentional  
Discrimination 
Even those who accept that, as discussed above, the text of the Fair 
Housing Act allows for disparate impact theory are sometimes confused 
 
 151. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 152. See 29 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
 153. Id. 
 154. I note that many other scholars and advocates have provided a much more in-
depth discussion of the text of the Fair Housing Act, Title VII, and the ADEA.  See, 
e.g., Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents, supra note 15, at 30-33; 
Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010).  I 
offer a brief discussion of the text not to provide a full statutory analysis or textualist 
argument, but simply to show that the text of the Fair Housing Act does not preclude 
disparate impact analysis. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
 156. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 388 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Woods-
Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972))). 
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about how disparate impact theory comes into play in Fair Housing cases, 
particularly in the urban redevelopment context.157  The confusion stems, in 
part, from the fact that disparate impact evidence can be properly used to help 
prove disparate treatment claims.158  It may help to understand the difference 
between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims through the lens of a 
few examples. 
Consider a recent case from St. Bernard Parish (the “Parish”) in Louisi-
ana.  In that lawsuit, litigants claimed, among other things, that the Parish 
intended159 to restrict African Americans from moving into the Parish after 
Hurricane Katrina – a classic disparate treatment claim.160  According to the 
plaintiffs in the case, to accomplish its discriminatory goal of keeping African 
Americans out, the Parish enacted a series of discriminatory ordinances, in-
cluding one that restricted property owners in the Parish (who were mostly 
 
 157. The Third Circuit criticized the district court decision in Mt. Holly for con-
flating the disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses.  Mt. Holly Gardens 
Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2011).  
At times, however, the Third Circuit fell into the same trap.  Id. at 385 
(“[E]stablishment of a prima facie case by itself is not enough to establish liability 
under the FHA.  It simply results in a more searching inquiry into the defendant’s 
motivations . . . .”).  Though it got to the right result – that disparate impact claims are 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act – the Third Circuit added ‘disparate treatment 
language’ into its decision.  See id. at 385-87.  In a disparate impact case, the “more 
searching inquiry” should not be into the motivations of the defendant, but rather into 
whether there were less discriminatory alternatives that the defendant failed to take.  
See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Inten-
tions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1141, 1142 (2007) (noting generally that even when purporting to utilize disparate 
impact theory, courts and litigants often focus on the “state of mind” of decision-
makers, blending disparate treatment analysis with disparate impact analysis.  “Liti-
gants mix and match disparate treatment and disparate impact allegations, defenses, 
and burdens of proof like spring sportswear.”). 
 158. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 157, at 1189-91 (“[T]he possible universe of 
disparate impact cases includes both those cases in which discriminatory intent is 
causing the impact and those in which discriminatory intent is having no role in the 
outcome.”); see also Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Dispar-
ate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 97 
(2006). 
 159. The case involved disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, though, 
for the purposes of this discussion, I address the disparate treatment claims.  See infra 
note 160 and accompanying text. 
 160. Marlene Theberge, Fair Housing Center Announces $900,000 Settlement 
Agreement with St. Bernard Parish; Pleased with Settlement Between United States 
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white) to renting only to their own blood relatives.161  The ordinance was 
neutral on its face – that is, it treated African American and white property 
owners identically.162  But the litigants had strong direct evidence of inten-
tional discrimination, including the fact that Craig Taffaro, the member of the 
Parish Council who drafted and sponsored the blood-relative ordinance, ad-
mitted that the goal of the ordinance was  to maintain the demographics, 
which, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, was 86.4% white.163  Additionally, 
Parish Councilpersons voting against the ordinance indicated that the Parish 
Council’s goal was to “block the blacks from living in these areas.”164 
In addition to their direct evidence of intentional discrimination, the 
plaintiffs in the St. Bernard Parish case also had strong circumstantial evi-
dence of intentional discrimination, among which was evidence that the ordi-
nance would have a disparate impact on African Americans, who, at the time, 
were seeking rental housing in the New Orleans area at much greater rates 
than whites, and who would be largely unable to secure rental housing in the 
Parish under the blood-relative ordinance.165  It was clear that the decision-
makers were aware of this disparate impact; thus evidence of disparate impact 
was relevant to the disparate treatment claim.166 
 
 161. The series of actions intended to restrict African Americans from renting 
within the Parish also included passing an ordinance that required single-family 
homeowners in residential zones to obtain permits before they could rent their proper-
ties, revising the zoning code to greatly reduce the amount of property available for 
multifamily housing, and perhaps most obviously discriminatory, passing the “blood 
relative” ordinance mentioned above.  See Seicshnaydre, supra note 157, at 1189-90. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 1189 n.257; see also Sabrina Canfield, USA Sees Racial Discrimi-
nation in New Orleans, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:39 PM), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/02/02/43566.htm; Editorial, Time Runs Out 
for St. Bernard Parish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011),  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/30/opinion/30wed3.html. 
 164. Seicshnaydre, supra note 157, at 1189 n.258. 
 165. Id. at 1189. 
 166. Some argue that disparate impact theory is primarily a tool for litigants to 
root out hard-to-prove intentional discrimination.  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1231 (1995).  Certainly, as ex-
plained herein, evidence of a disparate impact can be used to shore up a disparate 
treatment claim – e.g. evidence that a policy disproportionately impacts minorities 
and that the decision-makers knew of such the disproportionate impact could lead a 
fact finder to infer that the decision-maker intended the disparate result.  But disparate 
impact claims can and should stand on their own.  See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 
157, at 1189.  See id., for a more detailed analysis of some theorists’ argument that 
disparate impact analysis is simply an “evidentiary dragnet” aimed at catching inten-
tional discrimination that otherwise might be missed. 
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B.  Disparate Impact as a Stand-Alone Claim – The Key to Disparate 
Impact Analysis 
Disparate impact evidence is not just a way to show that an actor had a 
discriminatory intent when that intent is difficult to prove (though it certainly 
can be used that way) – the thrust of this Article and the key to the recently-
settled Mt. Holly case (and, presumably, the next disparate impact case to 
reach the Supreme Court) is an argument that disparate impact evidence can 
support independent claims under the Fair Housing Act, even when there was 
no discernible intent to discriminate.167  As explained in greater detail in Part 
IV, the use of disparate impact as a stand-alone claim is, perhaps, most im-
portant in urban redevelopment cases, where the intent of municipal actors 
often has little to do with whether a municipal decision will further segrega-
tion or limit housing opportunities for the very communities the Fair Housing 
Act seeks to protect. 
Another example, this time involving a disparate impact claim, might 
prove useful.  Imagine that a municipality seeks to redevelop at least one of 
its many blighted neighborhoods.  To accomplish its redevelopment goal, the 
municipality plans to purchase or take properties, destroy all existing struc-
tures, and rebuild the community as a mixed-income development (much as 
the municipality did in the Mt. Holly case).  No matter which blighted neigh-
borhood the municipality chooses, it is likely that many of the current resi-
dents will be unable to afford to return to the neighborhood once it is rede-
veloped.  Due to past government-sanctioned discrimination, now-outlawed 
restrictive covenants, and perhaps some element of personal preference, one 
of the blighted neighborhoods is mostly African American while another one 
of the blighted neighborhoods is mostly white.  In both of the neighborhoods, 
the current residents are largely opposed to the plans.  The municipality 
chooses to redevelop, and hence dismantle, the African American neighbor-
hood, not because the decision-makers harbor a racist intent, but because the 
community meetings on the matter took place in the evenings, at a time when 
minorities were less able to attend than whites, and, as a result, slightly fewer 
minorities showed up to object to the redevelopment than their white neigh-
bors. 
This is an example of a case that does not involve any intent to discrim-
inate; the municipality made its decision based on a neutral factor – the num-
ber of residents voicing opposition to the project – but its effect will be dis-
proportionately born by African Americans, most of who will have to leave 
the municipality, which will increase racial segregation.  Here, evidence of 
disparate impact would not be used to buttress a claim for intentional discrim-
ination but instead would stand on its own under the Fair Housing Act.  If the 
 
 167. Arlington Heights and its progeny, of course, indicate that intent is one of the 
factors to be considered, but other jurisdictions and the new HUD rule, see supra note 
7, indicate that, even without evidence of intent, disparate impact claims must be able 
to proceed. 
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Fair Housing Act is to have any chance at succeeding at its drafters’ goal of 
replacing the ghetto with “truly integrated and balanced living patterns,”168 
the mere fact that an action has a disparate impact on a protected class must 
result in a cognizable claim under the Fair Housing Act.169   The Fair Housing 
Act is aimed not just at stopping bad actors (i.e. those with the intention to 
discriminate), but also at preventing bad acts (i.e. actions that have a discrim-
inatory effect regardless of intention). 
IV.  DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT 
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT DECISIONS DO NOT UNDERMINE THE 
GOALS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
The underlying facts of disparate impact cases in the urban redevelop-
ment context make it plain that these types of cases, even more than the em-
ployment discrimination cases to which they are analogized, cry out for dis-
parate impact analysis for three main reasons.  First, urban redevelopment 
decisions, unlike employment decisions, are often made through a diffuse and 
complicated process where intent is neither relevant to whether discrimina-
tion occurred nor possible to discern.  Second, widely accepted social science 
research tells us that much racism occurs with no discriminatory intent at 
all.170  Given the protracted manner in which urban redevelopment decisions 
are made, it is especially possible that unconscious or unintentional bias 
could influence the outcome.  Finally, urban redevelopment decisions are 
among the main forces shaping our cities right now; the ills of segregation 
will not be remedied by simply thwarting the actions of individual intentional 
discriminators. 
 
 168. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
 169. Recall that the question before the Supreme Court in Gallagher and Mt. 
Holly was simply whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair 
Housing Act.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  If found cognizable, that 
certainly does not determine the merits of individual cases – courts will still have to 
engage in the burden shifting analysis described in Griggs and other Title VII and 
Fair Housing cases (and now formalized in a HUD rule).  The question before the 
Court in Gallagher and Mt. Holly was simply whether plaintiffs who lose housing 
opportunities due to an action that has a disparate impact on minorities may walk 
through the courthouse doors – as explained elsewhere in this Article, such plaintiffs 
must then shoulder a heavy evidentiary burden.  See infra Part V.B. 
 170. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round 
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 506-07, 532-33 (2003) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of disparate impact theory since 1971); see also Charles R. Law-
rence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Rac-
ism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Destiny Peery, Note, The Colorblind Ideal in a 
Race-Conscious Reality: The Case for a New Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6 NW. J. 
L. & SOC. POL’Y 473, 481 (2011). 
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A.  Intent Is Not Relevant (and Can Be Impossible to Discern) When 
Decisions Are Made via a Diffuse Process 
In the employment context (to which Fair Housing Act cases are fre-
quently compared) decisions are often linear and made by individuals acting 
alone – a supervisor, for example, may institute a policy that disadvantages 
minorities or a human resources manager may create a test that filters out 
African American applicants.  In these cases, while it may be challenging to 
prove intent, especially when individuals take pains to mask it, a discrimina-
tory intent can often be found at the root of a discriminatory result.171  In con-
trast, decisions related to housing, especially in the urban redevelopment con-
text, are often made by diffuse municipal bodies in which individuals and 
groups have differing and even conflicting motivations and where a discrimi-
natory intent may not be present, even where a discriminatory result ensues. 
Looking more closely at how decisions regarding urban redevelopment 
are made, it is easy to see how a linear or definable “intent” may be absent in 
many urban redevelopment or land use decisions.  Unlike in the employment 
context, in the urban redevelopment context, decisions are not made by one 
individual or entity; instead, decisions are made via a complex democratic 
process involving many competing constituencies.  It is possible that a plan-
ning committee may be concerned with traffic, the environmental review 
board may be concerned with impacts on wildlife, a mayor may be concerned 
with street safety, and residents may be concerned with density.  The process 
to create a redevelopment plan may take years and involve tens or hundreds 
of individuals, each with different agendas.  But if the result of the decision-
making process is a plan that will have a substantial segregating impact or if a 
project would foreclose housing opportunities to a protected class, the Fair 
Housing Act should (and, under the precedent in eleven circuits, does) require 
municipalities to consider alternatives that would have a less discriminatory 
impact.172 
 
 171. See generally Selmi, supra note 10, at 776-81 (“Because subtle discrimina-
tion is not fueled by a conscious motive or any express animus, there has been a 
struggle in the literature to determine whether existing proof structures can accom-
modate the changed nature of discrimination, and some scholars have proposed new 
proof structures that typically fuse elements of intent and impact.”).  As explained in 
Part III of this Article, disparate impact evidence could be utilized to prove a dispar-
ate treatment claim, such as the one described in this example.  See supra Part III.A. 
 172. It is important to point out that the issue in Gallagher and Mt. Holly is not 
whether every litigant who can show that a municipal decision has a disparate impact 
on minorities should win his or her case; the issue is only whether such cases are 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  If 
they are, as eleven circuits have held, then plaintiffs must still show that there was a 
less discriminatory manner by which the municipality could have accomplished its 
legitimate goals and that the municipality failed to pursue that less discriminatory 
alternative.  See infra Part V.B. 
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Recent events, such as Hurricane Katrina, display how diffuse decision-
making may result in disparate and discriminatory impacts, even when there 
is no intent to discriminate.173  As one scholar asks, “Does it matter that no 
one intended for a disproportionate number of poor persons of color to be left 
behind when Hurricane Katrina hit? . . . Does it matter that no one intended 
for those without the resources to leave to be now unable to find the resources 
to return?”174  Even if those individuals and entities making decisions have no 
discriminatory intent at all, shouldn’t the Fair Housing Act prevent New Or-
leans from being reconstructed as a city that is largely unavailable to African 
American residents?  Surely this is the type of situation that the Fair Housing 
Act should address given that it makes it illegal not just to “discriminate” on 
the basis of race, but also to “otherwise make unavailable or deny” housing 
because of race. 
Other post-Katrina ordinances further highlight the fact that intent can-
not be the only inquiry in Fair Housing matters because of the diffuse and 
multi-layered manner in which housing-related decisions come into being.  
Shortly after the storm, the Pointe Coupee Parish, near New Orleans, adopted 
an ordinance reading: “RESOLVED, That trailer parks of temporary housing 
for displaced evacuees of Hurricane Katrina and Rita not be created by 
FEMA in Point Coupee Parish.”175  Perhaps the councilmembers who passed 
the ordinance were concerned with traffic, aesthetics, or increased enrollment 
in schools.  Perhaps they were retaliating against FEMA, an agency that, after 
Hurricane Katrina, was viewed largely as ineffective, at best, and intentional-
ly negligent, at worst.  Perhaps the intents of the individuals shifted over 
time, as the ordinance made its way through the democratic process.176  But 
regardless of intent, if the council’s action served to lock African American 
residents out of the Pointe Coupee Parish or to increase segregation in the 
area, surely those residents must be able to pursue a claim under the Fair 
Housing Act.177  As one author asks, if it were established “that the majority 
of those displaced persons . . . in need of . . .  housing were persons of color” 
and that the ordinance would serve to exclude such people from Pointe Cou-
 
 173. As discussed in Part IV of this Article, many municipalities behaved in ways 
that were intentionally discriminatory after Hurricane Katrina; others, however, 
passed ordinances and took actions that could not be traced to a discriminatory intent 
but still had a discriminatory effect.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 174. Seicshnaydre, supra note 157, at 1188. 
 175. Id. at 1190 n.262. 
 176. Of course, it is also possible that the ordinance was passed with the intent of 
excluding minorities. 
 177. Note that plaintiffs in such a case might not prevail under the Fair Housing 
Act.  As discussed throughout this Article, in most circuits prior to the recent HUD 
rule, and presumably in all circuits after the HUD rule, disparate impact analysis 
allows plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case, after which defendants have an op-
portunity to show that the action in question was taken in pursuit of a legitimate ob-
jective.  The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that there was a less dis-
criminatory alternative, which the plaintiff failed to pursue.  See infra note 208. 
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pee Parish, does it matter what went on in the minds of the decision-
makers?178 
Looking at the Mt. Holly case – the Fair Housing case granted certiorari 
by the Supreme Court in the 2012-2013 term – it is easy to see how an intent 
to discriminate can be divorced from whether a municipal decision has an 
impact that would undermine the purposes of the Fair Housing Act.  As noted 
above, in that case, the municipality spent a considerable amount of time 
studying the Gardens neighborhood before declaring it “blighted” and insti-
tuting a redevelopment plan that would wipe the existing neighborhood off 
the map and scatter most of the Township’s minority residents to already 
segregated areas.179  There is no evidence that any of the many influencers 
and decision makers had an intent to increase racial isolation or further segre-
gation – no individual councilmember remarked publically on the racial im-
plications of the development plan, no document revealed racial animus, and 
no paper trail created an inference of discriminatory intent.180 
Unlike in the employment context (where, as noted above, decisions are 
usually made through a linear and hierarchical system), no one individual or 
body was entirely responsible for the multitude of decisions that led to the 
redevelopment plans in Mount Holly.  Presumably, the developer worked 
with architects, banks, and city planners to devise a redevelopment plan; the 
planning department, environmental review board, traffic department, and 
other committees likely weighed in; public input was taken into considera-
tion; the plan was revised numerous times over the course of years, etc.  With 
such a diffuse and protracted process, it could be impossible to ascertain a 
specific intent to discriminate, and indeed such intent may not exist.  But, if 
the result of such a decision-making process fuels segregation, shouldn’t such 
a claim be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act? 
As stated elsewhere in this Article, the question before the Supreme 
Court in Gallagher and Mt. Holly was not whether the plaintiffs should win 
on the merits but simply whether they may have their day in court.181  If dis-
parate impact claims are found to be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, 
then courts engage in the burden shifting analysis first outlined in Griggs and 
then followed in most Fair Housing cases.182  At its core, the burden shifting 
analysis simply asks courts to determine whether there was another less dis-
criminatory way for the defendant to accomplish its legitimate, non-
discriminatory goal.  If another path exists for municipalities to accomplish 
their legitimate non-discriminatory redevelopment goals, which would have a 
less damaging impact on the communities that the Fair Housing Act intends 
 
 178. Seicshnaydre, supra note 157, at 1190. 
 179. Brief for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents, supra note 15, at 8-9. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See supra Part I.A. 
 182. As previously stated, the majority of circuits utilize a burden-shifting para-
digm, while some use a four-factor test.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text.  
Presumably, since the codification of the recent HUD rule regarding disparate impact, 
all circuits will utilize the burden shifting mechanism described therein. 
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to protect, then, under the current Fair Housing Act jurisprudence, the munic-
ipality could be forced to pursue that alternate path.  This result seems in line 
with both the Fair Housing Act and, presumably (assuming that it had no 
intent to discriminate), the general will of the municipality at issue. 
Requiring a showing of intent under the Fair Housing Act (something 
the Supreme Court seems poised to do) would ignore the basic facts of hous-
ing discrimination cases – cases in which, because of the diffuse decision-
making process at issue, intent is neither discernible nor relevant to the ques-
tion of whether discrimination occurred. 
B.  Social Science Tells Us That Intent Is Not a Critical Element of 
Discrimination 
Requiring proof of discriminatory intent as a prerequisite to a Fair Hous-
ing Act claim “ignores much of what [is understood] about how the human 
mind works.”183  Racial bias, we know from multiple social science studies, is 
so ingrained in our culture that acting on such bias can rarely be called inten-
tional.184  Indeed, as one scholar put it, “Insisting that a blameworthy perpe-
trator be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be acknowl-
edged . . . creates an imaginary world,” which serves to perpetuate discrimi-
nation by failing to even acknowledge its presence.185 
One judge, writing about the increased focus on intent in the employ-
ment discrimination context, described the “imaginary world” that a require-
ment of intent would create as follows: 
It is as if the bench is saying: Discrimination is over.  The market is 
bias-free . . . . The complex phenomenon that is discrimination can be 
reduced to a simple paradigm of the errant discriminator or the explic-
itly biased policy, a paradigm that rarely matches the reality of twen-
ty-first-century life.186 
Another scholar put it this way: 
The urban oppression now experienced by so many blacks is neither 
natural nor inevitable.  In assessing responsibility, little is gained by 
searching out individual perpetrators.  A regime sustains subordination 
through generating “devices, institutions, and circumstances that im-
 
 183. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 323.  The author is writing about the Equal 
Protection Clause and not the Fair Housing Act, yet he suggests that if the symbol has 
cultural connotations or implications, it can be assumed it is demonstrative of uncon-
scious racist intent.  Id. 
 184. See id. at 317; Peery, supra note 170, at 481; Primus, supra note 170, at 532-
33. 
 185. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 324-25. 
 186. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111-12 (2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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pose burdens or constraints on the target group without resort to re-
peated or individualized discriminatory actions.”187 
Even where there is a single decision-maker (as opposed to the diffuse 
process described above), social science tells us that discrimination can occur, 
and indeed more often than not does occur, without intent.  Where there are 
multiple decision-makers, working towards consensus through a lengthy and 
protracted urban redevelopment process, the likelihood that implicit bias will 
play a role in the outcome is only increased. 
Municipal bodies, such as planning boards, exist to make decisions that 
impact large groups of people.  The conscious intent of the body to, for ex-
ample, ease traffic congestion in a particular area might be entirely divorced 
from whether the outcome has a discriminatory impact due to the effects of 
implicit bias.  If municipal leaders, trying to ease traffic congestion in a white 
neighborhood, decide to construct a highway through the area’s only African 
American neighborhood, it may be entirely possible that the decision-makers 
had no intent to harm African Americans.  At the same time, we know from 
countless studies that biased results occur even where there is no discrimina-
tory intent.188  Municipal decision-makers, like all of us, implicitly make 
judgments on the worth and value of particular people and neighborhoods, 
and, when those judgments have biased or discriminatory results, the fact that 
the decision-maker did not intend the bias is of no comfort to those impacted. 
In the Township of Mount Holly, for example, it is likely that the indi-
viduals, from those involved in the decision to declare the Gardens neighbor-
hood “blighted” to those responsible for generating the redevelopment plan, 
harbored implicit biases, which made them more likely to support the de-
struction of a minority community (as opposed to a redevelopment plan that 
would be more likely to increase integration).  There is little in the text of the 
Fair Housing Act or the existing Fair Housing Act jurisprudence to suggest 
that the Fair Housing Act is meant to distinguish between the type of implicit 
bias described above and intentional discrimination. 
C.  The Success of the Fair Housing Act Depends on the Survival of 
Disparate Impact Jurisprudence 
Urban redevelopment decisions are among the main forces shaping our 
cities and towns, and, as noted above, disparate treatment analysis alone is 
not sufficient to thwart the segregating effects that sometimes flow from such 
decisions.  If it is to achieve its goal of providing increased and better housing 
opportunities for members of protected classes, Fair Housing advocates need 
 
 187. Calmor, supra note 52, at 1508 (quoting Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of 
Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 828 (1983)). 
 188. See Lawrence, supra note 170, at 318; Peery, supra note 170, at 481; Primus, 
supra note 170, at 532-33. 
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a tool that will address the most pressing fair housing concern – the manner 
in which municipalities engage in development. 
Recall that the survival of disparate treatment analysis will not prevent 
redevelopment of urban areas; instead, it will push municipalities contemplat-
ing redevelopment projects to consider whether there might be a path towards 
their legitimate interest that has a lesser disparate impact on a minority com-
munity.  Assuming that the decision-makers within the municipality have no 
discriminatory intent, such a push will generally be in line with the munici-
pality’s goals. 
V.  RESPONDING TO COMMON CONCERNS 
In this section, I respond to some common concerns about disparate im-
pact analysis – e.g. that it requires race-consciousness in a statutory context 
that seems to promote racial blindness; that municipalities and housing pro-
viders will not know how to avoid liability; and that all urban redevelopment 
decisions will subject municipalities to litigation. 
A.  The Fair Housing Act Allows, and in Some Cases Even Requires, 
Some Amount of Race-Consciousness 
Critics of disparate impact analysis assert that the Fair Housing Act pro-
hibits decision-making “because of race.”189  Disparate impact analysis, these 
critics claim, requires decision-makers to consider race, and therefore the Fair 
Housing Act or equal protection principles must forbid such a method of 
analysis.190  Indeed, the critics are right – disparate impact analysis does re-
quire decision-makers to consider race in some instances.  For example, in 
order to avoid liability under the burden-shifting analysis described above, 
decision-makers may need to evaluate whether there are means to accomplish 
their objectives that would have a less discriminatory effect.  Municipalities 
engaged in redevelopment projects, such as the one at issue in the Mt. Holly 
case, might avoid liability by studying the potential impacts of decisions on 
 
 189. As noted in Section II, Section 3604 indicates that 
[I]t shall be unlawful – 
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to re-
fuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or 
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, famil-
ial status, or national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facil-
ities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 190. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 136 and Richard Primus, The Future of 
Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2010), for a discussion of disparate 
impact analysis and the Equal Protection Clause. 
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particular racial groups in an effort to determine a path with the least discrim-
inatory outcome. 
This type of race-conscious thinking, critics of disparate impact claim, is 
precisely the type of race-based decision-making that the Fair Housing Act 
sought to eradicate.  It is hard to imagine, however, that the Fair Housing Act 
is not meant to incentivize municipal decision-makers to seek the path with 
the least discriminatory effect when making decisions about community re-
development. 
Indeed, the Fair Housing Act does not have a single, race-blind pur-
pose.191  Instead, it appears to have a number of sometimes conflicting objec-
tives.  On the one hand, one of its goals is to eradicate segregation, or, as its 
sponsor Senator Mondale put it, replace the “ghettos” with “truly integrated 
and balanced living patterns.”192  On the other hand, the Fair Housing Act is 
clearly also concerned with preventing race from being a factor in housing 
related decision-making.193 
Even the language in the “purpose” clause of the Fair Housing Act is, at 
best, unhelpful in determining whether Congress originally intended the Fair 
Housing Act to allow for race-conscious thinking.  It indicates that its pur-
pose is to provide “for fair housing throughout the United States.”194  What 
“fair housing” means, and whether race can be taken into account at all in 
ensuring that it is provided in accordance with the Act, is not made clear. 
Courts first grappled with the issue of whether the Fair Housing Act al-
lows for (and perhaps calls for) race-consciousness in two disparate treatment 
cases in the early 1970s.  In the first, Shannon v. HUD, the Third Circuit held 
that the Fair Housing Act’s demand in Section 3608 that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) act “affirmatively to further” fair 
housing prohibited HUD from funding a housing project in a minority neigh-
borhood without first considering the impact that the project would have on 
racial concentration in the area.195   In that case, the court held that HUD 
 
 191. See SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at § 11:A2 (noting that the Fair Housing Act’s 
dual goals of integration and nondiscrimination are sometimes in conflict with one 
another). 
 192. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968); SCHWEMM, supra note 45, at 
§ 2:3. 
 193. The legislative history of the Fair Housing Act supports the notion that Con-
gress was concerned with both remedying discrimination and alleviating segregation.  
Addressing the issue of segregation, Senator Mondale, the Fair Housing Act’s princi-
pal sponsor hoped that the Fair Housing Act would remedy “the alienation of whites 
and blacks caused by the lack of experience in actually living next to each other.”  
114 CONG. REC. 2275 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Similarly, on the House side, Congressman Celler, the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee indicated that the purpose of the Fair Housing Act would be to “eliminate 
the blight of segregated housing and the pale of the ghetto.”  114 CONG. REC. 9559 
(1967). 
 194. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
 195. 436 F.2d 809, 816, 821 (3d Cir. 1970). 
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could not ignore the negative effects (or disparate impact) that its decisions 
might have on minority neighborhoods; according to the court, “Today, such 
color blindness is impermissible.”196 
In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, issued three years after 
the Shannon decision, the Second Circuit held that a public housing agency 
could favor white applicants over African Americans for units in a new hous-
ing complex if the policy was necessary to maintain integration in the area.197  
In Otero, the housing agency was concerned that, if a race-conscious applica-
tion program was not used, the complex would “tip” and become all black 
due to white flight.198  The court held that a race-conscious tenant-selection 
system could be used if there was “convincing evidence” that a color-blind 
system would “almost surely lead to eventual destruction of the racial integra-
tion that presently exists in the community.”199 
The most famous Fair Housing case involving race-conscious tenant-
selection aimed at promoting integration is United States v. Starrett City As-
sociates.200  In that case, the defendants were owners of a huge housing com-
plex in New York that consisted of forty-six high-rise buildings, which 
housed over 17,000 residents.201  In order to maintain the complex as an inte-
grated community, the defendants established a tenant selection system with 
strict quotas by race.  Because far more African American and Latinos ap-
plied to be residents, the quota system resulted in large numbers of minorities 
being rejected in favor of white applicants.  In a two-to-one decision, the 
Second Circuit struck down Starrett City’s quota system, distinguishing it 
from the system in Otero because Otero’s system was temporary and related 
only to the lease-up of apartments while Starrett City’s system was ongo-
ing.202  Race-consciousness is acceptable, the Second Circuit held, as long as 
it is temporary in nature.203  Per the court, additional factors to consider 
would be (1) whether the plan or action is designed to remedy some prior 
racial discrimination or imbalance and (2) whether the plan seeks to increase 
opportunities for minorities as opposed to limiting them.204 
The Fair Housing Act’s comfort with some amount of race-
consciousness extends beyond tenant-selection programs to other housing-
related decisions as well.  For example, HUD has promulgated regulations 
 
 196. Id. at 820. 
 197. 484 F.2d 1122, 1140 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 198. Id. at 1135. 
 199. Id. at 1136. 
 200. 840 F.2d 1096, 1098 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 201. Id. at 1103. 
 202. Id. at 1102-03 (citing Otero, 484 F.2d at 1126). 
 203. Id. at 1101-03. 
 204. Id. at 1101-02 (internal citations omitted) (explaining that unlike in the af-
firmative action context, where “measures designed to increase or ensure minority 
participation, such as ‘access’ quotas . . . have generally been upheld . . . .  [P]rograms 
designed to maintain integration by limiting minority participation, such as ceiling 
quotas . . . are of doubtful validity”). 
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requiring participants in federal housing programs to reach out to certain ra-
cial and ethnic groups.205  HUD has also required municipalities utilizing 
certain federal funds to certify that the municipality is taking measures to 
“affirmatively further fair housing” and to “aid in the prevention or elimina-
tion of slums or blight.”206  In order to ensure that municipalities are properly 
furthering fair housing goals, HUD requires municipalities to study the im-
pacts of proposed housing programs on racial groups and to formulate re-
sponses that promote integration and housing opportunity for members of 
protected classes.207  Indeed, in the time since certiorari was granted in the 
Mt. Holly case, HUD has issued two new regulations that explicitly call for 
race-consciousness in housing decisions.  The first explains HUD’s approach 
to disparate impact cases and was promulgated, it seems, in direct response to 
the question raised in Gallagher and Mt. Holly.208  The second, which is still 
in draft form, provides a structure through which municipalities that receive 
certain federal funds must study the impact of municipal decision-making on 
housing opportunities for protected classes.209 
 
 205. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.600-.640 (2013). 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2), (b)(3) (2012). 
 207. Id. at § 5304(a)(2). 
 208. According to the HUD-issued summary, the rule “formalizes the longstand-
ing interpretation of the Fair Housing Act to include discriminatory effects liability 
and establishes a uniform standard of liability for facially neutral practices that have a 
discriminatory effect.”  Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory 
Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,479 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. 
pt. 100). Under the rule, the burden-shifting approach is as follows: (1) the charging 
party first bears the burden of proving its prima facie case of either disparate impact 
or perpetuation of segregation; (2) then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove 
that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more of its legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests; and (3) if the defendant satisfies its burden, the charging 
party may still establish liability by demonstrating that the “substantial, legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests . . . could be served by another practice that has a less 
discriminatory effect.”  24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013).  By requiring the parties to ex-
amine whether there is a “less discriminatory” path, the HUD rule requires a certain 
amount of race-conscious thinking. 
 209. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,710-01 (proposed 
July 19, 2013).  According to the HUD-issued summary of the proposed regulation, 
the purpose of the regulation is to 
focus[] program participants’ analysis on four primary goals: improving inte-
grated living patterns and overcoming historic patterns of segregation; reduc-
ing racial and ethnic concentrations of poverty; reducing disparities by race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability in access to 
community assets such as education, transit access, and employment, as well 
as exposure to environmental health hazards and other stressors that harm a 
person’s quality of life; and responding to disproportionate housing needs by 
protected class. 
U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD’S NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON 
AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING (2013), available at http://www.huduser
.org/portal/affht_pt.html. 
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Thus, while courts have held that strict quotas that limit housing oppor-
tunities for minorities are not permissible, courts and HUD are comfortable 
with some element of race-consciousness in housing, provided that the race-
consciousness furthers the Fair Housing Act’s goal of promoting integration 
or providing increased housing opportunities to members of protected classes. 
In summary, the Fair Housing Act’s anti-discrimination principles usu-
ally control, and those principles only give way and allow a certain amount of 
race-conscious thinking when to do so would further the Fair Housing Act’s 
integrationist goals or would prevent policies that have an unjustified dispar-
ate impact on the groups that the Fair Housing Act seeks to protect. 
B.  Disparate Impact Analysis Is Not Limitless 
The second main critique of the disparate impact theory is that it knows 
no bounds and that liability will be found wherever there is proof of even the 
slightest disparate impact based on race.210 
Disparate impact theory does not call for liability whenever a disparate 
impact is detected; indeed, a finding of disparate impact is only the first step 
in the analysis – it is what may allow plaintiffs to get to the courthouse door.  
But a simple showing of disparate impact alone is not enough to open those 
courthouse doors.  First, plaintiffs must make out a prima facie case by show-
ing that a particular practice led or will lead to a racially disparate result.  
Pointing to the disparate effect itself is not enough; plaintiffs must show that 
a particular policy or action is responsible for the result.211  Relatedly, plain-
tiffs must show causation: that the policy or practice in question caused the 
disparate results. 
Additionally, liability will not hold when only minor disparate impacts 
are found.212  The statistical evidence used must show that there is a signifi-
cant disparity in the effects of a particular policy or decision based on race.213  
Courts scrutinize the statistical evidence carefully and require that it show – 
not just that there was some disparate impact – but that the disparate impact is 
so severe that to ignore it would be to thwart the purposes of the Fair Housing 
Act.214 
 
 210. Petitioners’ Opening Brief, supra note 138, at 39-44. 
 211. See Vega v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. CV-10-02087-PHX-
NVW, 2011 WL 2457398, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2011) (explaining that if Plaintiff 
cannot point to any “specific outwardly neutral practices that Defendants took that 
had a disproportionate impact upon her based on her race” her claim will fail). 
 212. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 62 (D. Mass. 
2002) (“The standard is not just disparate impact, but substantial disparate impact.”). 
 213. Id. (“[W]here a community has a smaller proportion of minority residents 
than does the larger geographical area from which it draws applicants to its Section 8 
program, a selection process that favors its residents cannot but work a disparate im-
pact on minorities.”). 
 214. See Khalil v. Farash Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (not-
ing that some “numbers are too small to be of any statistical significance . . .”), aff’d, 
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In addition to placing a heavy burden on the plaintiff, disparate impact 
analysis under the Fair Housing Act provides defendants with an opportunity 
to explain the disparate impact away.  Similar to the “business justification” 
rule in Title VII cases, defendants in Fair Housing cases can escape liability if 
they show that the facially neutral rule or decision which led to the disparate 
impact is necessary to accomplish a legitimate objective.215 
Perhaps the most significant limit placed on the disparate impact theory 
is that the plaintiff has the burden of showing that there was a less discrimina-
tory means to achieve the defendant’s objective.  The plaintiff cannot simply 
assert that the result of a policy is discriminatory; he or she must also show 
that there was another way to achieve the same legitimate policy objective 
without a disparate impact (or with a significantly less burdensome disparate 
impact).  If that proves to be an impossible feat, the defendant will prevail. 
This is no small burden.  Indeed, even while recognizing that disparate 
impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, when they get to 
the merits of cases, at the appellate level most courts have held that plaintiffs 
have failed to carry the burden of proving that the defendant failed to pursue a 
less discriminatory alternative.  Indeed, on appeal, plaintiffs have received 
positive decisions in less than twenty percent of the disparate impact claims 
considered under the Fair Housing Act since its inception.216 
An examination of cases in which plaintiffs did not prevail in disparate 
impact claims highlights the high bar for such claims.  In Darst-Webbe Ten-
ant Association Board v. St. Louis Housing Authority, for example, plaintiffs 
sought to thwart plans to replace 758 low income public housing units with a 
mix of housing that included only eighty low income housing units.217  The 
Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the plan would have a disparate impact on 
African Americans who occupied almost every one of the 758 low income 
units, but it held that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of presenting a 
less discriminatory plan that would accomplish all of the defendant’s policy 
objectives.218  Cases such as these highlight the fact that plaintiffs cannot 
simply sit back and complain about a disparate impact, no matter how severe; 
plaintiffs must also point to a realistic and sound solution that the defendant 
could implement in place of its proposed action. 
 
277 Fed. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 
352 F.3d 565, 575-76 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Statistical evidence is . . . normally used in 
cases involving fair housing disparate impact claims.”); Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. 
Research, 132 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The smaller the sample, the greater the 
likelihood that an observed pattern is attributable to other factors and accordingly the 
less persuasive the inference of discrimination to be drawn from it.”); Waisome v. 
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]here statistics 
are based on a relatively small number of occurrences, the presence or absence of 
statistical significance is not a reliable indicator of disparate impact.”). 
 215. See supra note 100. 
 216. Seicshnaydre, supra note 6, at 393. 
 217. 417 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 218. Id. at 906. 
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Despite this high bar, critics of disparate impact analysis still bristle at 
the “less discriminatory means” portion of the burden-shifting test.  “Should 
decision-makers have to waste time studying every possible alternative to 
make sure that there is no less discriminatory course of action?” they ask.  
Courts in the majority of circuits and HUD, by virtue of its rule-making au-
thority, have answered “yes.”219   Given the long history of racial discrimina-
tion that the Fair Housing Act seeks to remedy and the problems associated 
with entrenched segregation, courts have held that it is not too much to ask 
municipalities and housing providers to consider the impacts of their deci-
sions on protected classes and seek the least discriminatory path towards 
achieving legitimate objectives.  In the Third Circuit’s decision in Mt. Holly 
Gardens Citizens in Action v. Twp. of Mount Holly, the court noted: 
[t]he Township may be correct that a disparate impact analysis will of-
ten allow plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case when a segregated 
neighborhood is redeveloped in circumstances where there is a short-
age of alternative affordable housing.  But this is a feature of the 
FHA’s programming, not a bug.  The FHA is a broadly remedial stat-
ute designed to prevent and remedy invidious discrimination on the 
basis of race that facilitates its antidiscrimination agenda by encourag-
ing a searching inquiry into the motives behind a contested policy to 
ensure that it is not improper.220 
Without disparate impact analysis, municipalities and other decision-
makers will have no incentive to consider the impacts proposed actions may 
have on classes protected under the Fair Housing Act; and without this incen-
tive, there will be little chance that the Fair Housing Act will nudge our socie-
ty towards more integrated and fair housing patterns.  Laws are not just 
means of determining liability; they are structures that drive behavior.  If the 
Fair Housing Act will have any hope of addressing modern housing segrega-
tion, it will be because, when making redevelopment decisions, municipali-
ties will be forced to consider the potential disparate impacts of municipal 
actions. 
C.  An Additional Limit Proposed 
As discussed above, even while accepting disparate impact theory as 
cognizable, courts have been explicit in highlighting the fact that disparate 
 
 219. See cases cited supra note 7.  I note that while eleven circuits have held that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, those circuits 
following the four-factor approach of Arlington II may not rely on the “less discrimi-
natory alternative” approach.  Presumably, all circuits will now follow the approach 
outlined in the HUD rule, which does require an inquiry into less discriminatory al-
ternatives. 
 220. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 
F.3d 375, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
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impact theory is not without bounds – courts have held that the disparate im-
pacts must be severe, that plaintiffs have the burden of showing that there 
was a less discriminatory means of accomplishing defendants’ goals, and that 
a particular policy caused the disparate impact.  In addition to those explicit 
limitations, courts have often implicitly suggested an additional limitation.  
Relying on the Fair Housing Act’s dual purpose of prohibiting discrimination 
and ending segregation, courts have held that, in order to be successful, plain-
tiffs must show that the defendant’s actions would either limit housing oppor-
tunities for members of a protected class (i.e. “otherwise make unavailable or 
deny” housing) or increase segregation (or both).221 
The Fair Housing Act’s dual goals of prohibiting discrimination and 
ending segregation occasionally raise the question of what courts should do 
when the resolution of a case would put the Fair Housing Act’s anti-
discrimination goals in conflict with its anti-segregation goals.  Put another 
way, what should a court do when the anti-discrimination principle is in con-
flict with the “anti-subordination” principle? 
Under the anti-discrimination principle, the law should focus on reme-
dying individual harms caused by discriminatory acts.222  Under the anti-
subordination principle, anti-discrimination law should facilitate the types of 
social change necessary to eliminate group-based inequality.223  When these 
principles are in conflict, courts most often abide by the anti-discrimination 
principle if doing so would serve members of a protected class.  For example, 
in Starrett City, when asked to decide whether a quota system that was aimed 
at maintaining integration was allowable under the Fair Housing Act, the 
court determined that the quota system had a discriminatory effect on African 
Americans.224  As described above, because there were more African Ameri-
cans on the waiting list for housing in Starrett City, the quota system served 
to exclude African Americans even while it served its integrationist goal.225 
This seems like the right result.  Though the Fair Housing Act’s stated 
purpose to provide “for Fair Housing throughout the United States” is a bit 
vague, it certainly seems that it would be antithetical to our basic understand-
 
 221. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101, 1103 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (“We hold . . . that Title VIII does not allow appellants to use rigid racial 
quotas of indefinite duration to maintain a fixed level of integration at Starrett City by 
restricting minority access to scarce and desirable rental accommodations otherwise 
available to them.”). 
 222. Seicshnaydre, supra note 157, at 1183 (describing Professor Samuel R. Ba-
genstos’ work on the two purposes of employment discrimination law identified in 
legal scholarship). 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Starrett, 840 F.2d at 1103. 
 225. Id.  Starrett was, in many ways, a disparate treatment case, not a disparate 
impact case, however, presumably the same analysis could apply in disparate impact 
cases – if a neutral rule serves to limit housing opportunities for minorities, then such 
a claim should at least be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.  See generally id. 
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ing of “fairness” if the Act served to disadvantage African Americans in order 
to support integration. 
CONCLUSION 
Housing segregation and lack of housing opportunities for the communi-
ties that the Fair Housing Act purports to protect is at the root of many of our 
country’s societal ills, from gaps in educational achievement across color 
lines, to disparities in employment opportunities.  Emphasizing the intent 
behind individual acts, rather than the “cumulative effects of government and 
private decisions on historically disadvantaged communities of color, ob-
scures the complex connection between housing segregation and many other 
societal ills.”226 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court increasingly seems frustrated by con-
fronting the “branches” of racial inequality that grow from the roots of hous-
ing segregation – as Justice O’Conner expressed in the affirmative action 
context in Grutter v. Bollinger,227 and as was recently affirmed in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin,228 some on the Supreme Court feel that there 
should be a time limit on remedying our racist past.  The Supreme Court 
seems to have what I term “racial fatigue” – that is, it appears tired of litiga-
tion related to our racist past, as opposed to what it sees as our race-neutral 
present.  If the Supreme Court wishes to see fewer cases dealing with dispari-
ties in education or employment across racial lines, then it must not render 
the Fair Housing Act – the legislation aimed at remedying the roots of those 
problems – impotent. 
While the debate about whether the Fair Housing Act allows for the type 
of race-conscious thinking that is called for in disparate impact analysis will 
likely rage on, when one examines how redevelopment decisions are actually 
made, it becomes clear that a myopic hunt for intent may be fruitless.  In the 
complex and diffuse decision-making process that is at the heart of all rede-
velopment activity, it is the effects of such decisions, not the intent behind 
those decisions, which really matter.  As the Supreme Court stated in Jones v. 
Mayer Co., “when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes 




 226. Brief of Amicus Curiae Empower D.C. in Support of Respondents at 26, 
Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 569 
(2013) (No. 11-1507) (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level: 
The Consequences of Nonstate Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591, 1606-07 (2005)). 
 227. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (proposing a 25-year limit on affirmative action 
policies). 
 228. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 229. 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968). 
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